Threat Signal Report

New Proof of Concept Combining CVE-2019-1322 and CVE-2019-1405 Developed

Description

The FortiGuard SE Team is aware of a new proof of concept dubbed "COMahawk" disclosed on Nov 14 that incorporates CVE-2019-1405 and CVE-1322. The proof of concept combines two latest vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows CVE-2019-1405 {Windows UPnP Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability) and CVE-2019-1322 (Microsoft Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability) that allows for a full elevation of privilege on the machine for an unprivileged local user to obtain full administrative access to the machine.


What are the vulnerabilities specifically?

These vulnerabilities use both Elevation of Privilege (EoP) vulnerabilities, specifically for Windows UPnP Service (CVE-2019-1405) and in Microsoft Windows (CVE-2019-1322). CVE-2019-1405 is a logic error in a COM service and allows local unprivileged users to execute arbitrary commands as a LOCAL SERVICE user. The second issue CVE-2019-1322 is a simple service misconfiguration that allows any user in the local SERVICE group to reconfigure a service that executes as SYSTEM (according to the finder NCC group, this vulnerability was independently also discovered by other researchers in parallel). When combined, these vulnerabilities allow an unprivileged local user to execute arbitrary commands as the SYSTEM user on a default installation of Windows 10.

The UPnP Device Host service is enabled by default on Windows XP all the way to Windows 10 and executes as the user NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE. The service itself is either on by default or off dependent on Windows version. According the finders of the vulnerability the UPnP Device Host service allows all LOCAL users on the machine with "execute" privileges. Network users are unable to exploit remote launching of COM objects by a Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) in Windows.


Is there any indication of exploitation of this in the wild, specifically the proof of concept?

No.


Is remote exploitation possible?

This is a local vulnerability. However, if combined with an exploit or already compromised machine remote exploitation maybe possible.


Does this vulnerability require user interaction?

According to the proof of concept, the attacker must have access as a USER to the local machine. Theoretically, it can be combined with malware to execute without user consent.


What is the status of AV and/or IPS Coverage?

AV coverage was deemed not feasible for this event.

IPS coverage is not feasible as this is a local vulnerability.

We will continue to monitor this issue for any updates, and will update this Threat Signal when appropriate.


Are there patches available for CVE-2019-1322 and CVE-2019-1405?

Yes. Microsoft has patched CVE-2019-1322 for the October 2019 update and CVE-2019-1405 for the most recent November update. It is advised users apply the latest available patches whenever possible.


MITRE ATT&CK

Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

ID: T1068

Tactic: Privilege Escalation

Platform: Linux, macOS, Windows

System Requirements: In the case of privilege escalation, the adversary likely already has user permissions on the target system.

Permissions Required: User

Effective Permissions: User

Data Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process monitoring, Application logs

Version: 1.1


Definitions

Traffic Light Protocol

Color When Should it Be used? How may it be shared?

TLP: RED

Not for disclosure, restricted to participants only.
Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties, and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused. Recipients may not share TLP:RED information with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it was originally disclosed. In the context of a meeting, for example, TLP:RED information is limited to those present at the meeting. In most circumstances, TLP:RED should be exchanged verbally or in person.

TLP: AMBER

Limited disclosure, restricted to participants’ organizations.
Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon, yet carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved. Recipients may only share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization, and with clients or customers who need to know the information to protect themselves or prevent further harm. Sources are at liberty to specify additional intended limits of the sharing: these must be adhered to.

TLP: GREEN

Limited disclosure, restricted to the community.
Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations as well as with peers within the broader community or sector. Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels. Information in this category can be circulated widely within a particular community. TLP:GREEN information may not be released outside of the community.

TLP: WHITE

Disclosure is not limited.
Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.